Bolivia, Batteries, and Bureaucracy by Farr, Alexander S.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 17 | Number 2 Article 7
2011
Bolivia, Batteries, and Bureaucracy
Alexander S. Farr
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Comment and Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





I. BACKGROUND ON BOLIVIA AND LITHIUM
little over seventy years ago, Saudi Arabia was a poor, undevel-
oped nation without an international presence or any significant
influence.' After discovering it was sitting on over one quarter
of the world's total oil reserves, the nation vaulted to a wealthy and pow-
erful position that earned it substantial control and influence over inter-
national oil policy. 2 Looking halfway across the world to the small
landlocked nation of Bolivia, it is difficult to see a relevant comparison,
much less to suggest that Bolivia could be the next Saudi Arabia.3 The
comparison is appropriate, however, as Bolivia possesses the world's larg-
est supply of lithium reserves beneath the crust of its Salar de Uyuni salt
flats-an estimated 5.4 million tons of the eleven million known tons of
lithium in the world.4
This paper focuses first on what makes lithium such a potentially valua-
ble resource, considers the challenges Bolivia faces as it positions itself to
reap the most out of its strategic resource, and looks at how the nation's
history of resource exploitation at the hands of imperialist nations and
transnational corporations could color its development. It will then as-
sess Bolivia's history of nationalization through the lens of the most re-
cent 2006 nationalization of its hydrocarbon industry and how Bolivia
advances redefined resource ownership and indigenous rights under its
new constitution. Finally, the paper will consider the developmental suc-
cesses and societal pitfalls that Saudi Arabia experienced while develop-
ing its oil reserves in order to develop suggestions and warnings for how
Bolivia should proceed with exploiting its newfound wealth.
Three main conclusions arise from this analysis. First, in order to suc-
ceed as a major producer of lithium, Bolivia requires outside investment
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2011, SMU Dedman School of Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. See DARYL CHAMPION, THE PARADOXICAL KINGDOM 9 (2003).
2. See id.
3. Simon Romero, In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets Nationalism, NY TIMES, Feb.
3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/world/americas/031ithium.html?page
wanted=2& r=.
4. Anna Hopper, Recharging Bolivia: Evo Morales' Lithium Dilemma, HARVARD
INT'L REV., Summer 2009, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/
article/205506308.html.
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by foreign transnational corporations. To entice such corporations to
make significant investments, the Bolivian government must distance it-
self from the recent trend of nationalization. Bolivia can still ensure that
it has a place at the table in controlling the industry and reaping profits
from it through a system of participation (gradual repurchase of lithium
production assets), much like Saudi Arabia did with Saudi Aramco. Sec-
ond, Bolivia would also be well-served to protect the lithium market by
establishing a joint organization with other lithium producers, similar to
OPEC. Finally, to avoid the problems stemming from a welfare state,
rather than allowing profits from the lithium industry to accrue in govern-
ment coffers before being redistributed to citizens in the form of hand-
outs, Bolivia should allow all profits to be directly distributed to its
citizens and then rely on normal taxation for its own monetary needs. By
taking these steps, Bolivia has the potential to succeed much like Saudi
Arabia while avoiding some of the pitfalls that remain in Saudi Arabian
society today.
A. WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF LITHIUM?
Today, almost every laptop, cell phone, GPS, iPod, or other modern
electronic device utilizes a lithium-ion battery.5 In fact, the "United
States Geological Survey (USGS) [said that] one quarter of the lithium
mined last year was used solely for lithium ion (Lilon) batteries, which
operate portable electronic devices." 6 The reason that the lightweight
metal is preferred for such technology is that "at an elemental level, lith-
ium's atomic radius is smaller, and in turn metallic lithium is more
electro-negative, and boils at a lower temperature than any other metal,"
all of which makes for batteries that "weigh less, take up less space, and
last longer than alkaline batteries."7 In fact, the primary reason lithium-
ion batteries "are considered revolutionary [is] because . . . [they] can
hold a charge for eight times longer than alkaline versions."8 But appli-
cation in consumer-electronics is only the start, for those in the automo-
tive industry have their eye on the metal for the future of electric car
technology because "it weighs less than nickel, which is also used in bat-
teries, [which] would allow electric cars to store more energy and be
driven longer distances."9 With such advantages in mind, the U.S. gov-
5. Andrew Del-Colle, Lithium is Key to Powering a New Generation of Automobiles,
COLUMBIA MIssoURIAN, Aug. 26, 2009, http://www.columbiamissourian.com/sto-
ries/2009/08/26/lithium/.
6. Megan McAdams, A Grey Goldmine: Recent Developments in Lithium Extraction
in Bolivia and Alternative Energy Projects, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS,
Nov. 17, 2009, http://www.coha.org/a-grey-goldmine-recent-developments-in-lith-
ium-extraction-in-bolivia-and-alternative-energy-projects/.
7. April Howard, The Battle Over Bolivia's Lithium And The Future of Energy, To-
WARD FREEDOM, May 6, 2009, http://towarffreedom.com/home/content/view/
1582/64/ [hereinafter Battle].
8. April Howard, Salt of The Earth: Bolivia Extracts Its Lithium, Environment Be
Damned, IN TiiESE TIMES, May 6, 2009, http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/4360/
salt-of theearth/ [hereinafter Salt of the Earth].
9. Romero, supra note 3.
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ernment has been actively pushing for research and development in the
sector-"[w]hile on the campaign trail, President Obama promised that
by 2015, there would be one million plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles
on U.S. roads, and, once in office, he allocated billions of economic stim-
ulus package dollars toward battery technology and manufacturing."10
If such potential advances in the application of lithium technology were
to become a reality, it would "undoubtedly increase the demand for elec-
tric vehicles which [would] require a large amount of lithium in the next
few years" whereby those with lithium reserves would stand to benefit
significantly, not unlike Saudi Arabia whose wealth can be indirectly at-
tributed to the prevalence of the internal combustion engine over the past
century." With an eye on the future, Bolivia "is currently working to
assess, produce, and manufacture lithium products that correspond with
the rising global demand for clean energy vehicles."' 2 But there are de-
tractors who argue that to extract "enough lithium to meet even ten per-
cent of global automotive demand would cause irreversible and
widespread [environmental] damage,"13 and that "Lilon propulsion is in-
compatible with the notion of the 'Green Car."" 4
Other promising developments in the uses of the metal include updat-
ing the national energy grid utilizing technology currently being
researched by IBM, who "recently announced an ambitious project to
develop lithium-air batteries, which hold considerably more charge than
their lithium-ion cohorts, both for transportation and for powering the
national energy grid."15 While standard lithium-ion batteries can pro-
duce around 585 watt-hours of output, lithium-air batteries are signifi-
cantly more powerful with the potential to produce up to 5,000 watt-
hours.16 Such projects and expectations suggest that lithium truly will be-
come a crucial material for the future of global energy use and storage
and that the lithium market will undoubtedly continue to grow.' 7 In or-
der to reap the benefits of its abundance of the material, Bolivia will have
to take a hard look at its policies and development strategy.
B. BOLIVIA'S LITHIUm RESERVES
Despite its natural resource wealth, Bolivia remains one of the poorest
nations in South America,' 8 lacking even the "basics like adequate health
care and extensive infrastructure." 19 This deficiency proves problematic
10. Battle, supra note 7.
11. McAdams, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. The Trouble With Lithium 2: Under The Microscope, MERIDIAN INr'l RESEARCH,
May 29, 2008, available at http://www.meridian-int-res.com/Projects/Lithium-Mi-
croscope.pdf.
14. Id. at 1.
15. McAdams, supra note 6.
16. Id.
17. See Del-Colle, supra note 5.
18. Id.
19. Hopper, supra note 4.
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for the nation whose lithium reserves are located deep in the remotest
part of the country thereby requiring it "to drastically strengthen [its] in-
dustrial and transportation infrastructure in order to fully take advantage
of the country's lithium reserves [and] in order to meet the recent de-
mands for eco-friendly cars." 20 Furthermore, Bolivian President Evo
Morales is determined to avoid a repeat of the historic exploitation of the
nation's resources by outside forces and is therefore looking for ways to
keep control of the extraction, processing, and production of lithium
products on Bolivian soil.21 The former Mining Minister Mariobo
Moreno cautioned in an interview that the Bolivian government "must
resist globalizing 'instruments like transnational corporations and eco-
nomic and international political pressure." 22 In fact, "in the 1990s, pro-
posals to sell the lithium reserves to the American Lithium Corporation
were dropped after massive protests decried the benefits given to the
company." 23
But if President Morales wants to develop the infrastructure necessary
to begin processing lithium on a large scale, he does not have the luxury
of choosing many alternatives outside private sector financing and invest-
ment.24 With his predicament in mind, he is seeking collaboration from
transnational corporate investors who will help Bolivia develop a full-
scale lithium production process, starting with a small pilot plant out in
the Salar de Uyuni. 25 The pilot project is crucial to the development of a
more extensive industry since "[p]roducing lithium carbonate, even on a
relatively small scale, would lend more credibility to the government's
grand plans for Bolivia to become a global supplier of lithium."26 The
goal is for the project to evolve into a large-scale plant capable of produc-
ing twenty to thirty thousand metric tons of lithium carbonate a year
(about one-third of the current world supply being produced) 27 and also
refine the extracted resource into batteries to profit from a fully inte-
grated process. 28 Such an outcome now seems attainable given the recent
announcement by COMIBOL (the national mining company) that Boliv-
ian scientists discovered a "formula for producing high-quality lithium
carbonate" thereby allowing the nation to produce lithium without
outside expertise.
If Bolivia truly intends to break into the market as a major global sup-
plier and compete with those who already supply the world's lithium, it
has to act fast-currently Chile, Argentina, and Tibet supply the majority
20. Press Release, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Lucky Bolivia And The Future of
Lithium (Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WOO902/
S00340.htm [hereinafter Lucky Bolivia].
21. See Del-Colle, supra note 5.
22. Battle, supra note 7.
23. Salt of the Earth, supra note 8.
24. See Lucky Bolivia, supra note 20.
25. See id.
26. McAdams, supra note 6.
27. Id.
28. See Salt of the Earth, supra note 8.
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of lithium to the market 29 with the United States now importing predomi-
nantly from the South American nations.30 Furthermore, Mexico re-
cently uncovered its own significant deposit of the metal; thus Bolivia is
under pressure to get its own industrialized processes running.3' If and
when Bolivia begins to catch up to its neighbors in the trade, it might
even consider entering into an agreement similar to OPEC with the other
lithium producing nations in order to protect supply and pricing of the
material.32 The bulk of the responsibility lies with President Morales for
"[o]nly if he can quickly find the right balance between his people's needs
and international demand will he successfully be able to recover his coun-
try's economy." 3
II. THE MOTIVES BEHIND NATIONALIZATION
As the potential lithium economy develops in Bolivia, outside investors
are tepidly contemplating the idea of full-scale investment given the na-
tion's history of nationalizing the natural resources industry; "[T]o date,
Bolivia has nationalized its natural resources four times including the
2006 nationalization, and of the four, three have involved the hydrocar-
bon sector."34 To be precise, Bolivia nationalized the tin industry in 1952,
oil in 1937 and 1969, and most recently it nationalized the full hydrocar-
bons sector in President Morales' 2006 decree following his election.35
The reason that private investors are afraid is that "nationalization is gen-
erally defined as the transfer of private resources into the hands of the
public through the expropriation [takeover] of the assets of private own-
ers or investors." 36 Aside from pure governmental takeover, Bolivia's
history, particularly within the last twenty years, is rife with examples in
which the Bolivian people protested so vociferously that they drove vari-
ous private corporations out of the nation-in the 1990s, an American
lithium mining company (Lithco) was ousted,37 in 2000, the Water Wars
protesting privatization of the nation's water supply ended up driving a
subsidiary of Bechtel out, and in 2003, the Gas Wars led to violent pro-
tests which propagated the latest nationalization of the hydrocarbons
29. McAdams, supra note 6.
30. Jenny Mandel, USGS's Lithium Find Means Little For Mythical Shortfall, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/21/21greenwire-usgss-
lithium-find-means-little-for-mythical-s-62051.html.
31. See McAdams, supra note 6.
32. See Del-Colle, supra note 5.
33. Hopper, supra note 4.
34. Caroline Jova, Nationalization in Bolivia: Curse or Blessing?, 2 (Latin American
and Caribbean Ctr. (LACC) Working Paper Series, Paper No. 12, Aug. 2006),
http://lacc.fiu.edu/research-publications/working-papers/WPS-01 2 .pdf.
35. Sidney Weintraub, Issues in International Political Economy: Bolivia's Natural
Gas Nationalization, (Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies (CSIS), No. 77, May
2006), http://csis.org/publication/issues-international-political-economy-bolivias-
natural-gas-nationalization.
36. Jova, supra note 34, at 1.
37. Interview by Jane Bornemeier with Simon Romero, Reporter, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5,
2009), available at http://myenglishtimes.blogspot.com/2009/0 2/blog-post_05.html.
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A. COLONIAL EXPLOITATION OF BOLIVIA
The aggressive nationalization responses by the people and govern-
ment of Bolivia can best be explained by the country's "500-year history
of exploitation" at the hands of outsiders.39 Bolivia was once one of the
greatest sources of silver and other minerals, with a mining industry that
lined the pockets of imperialist Spain for 250 years beginning in 1545.40
The mining operations extracted some of "[t]he most important natural
resources found in Bolivian soil . . . metals such as gold, silver, tin, cad-
mium, tungsten, iron, lead and antimony."4' In fact, in addition to leav-
ing mountains stripped of all their natural value, the extensive extraction
of metals using mercury amalgamation left an environmental and health
disaster behind. 42 Over the course of the mining operations, "[a]round
two billion ounces of silver were extracted from . .. [Potosi's] Cerro Rico
(Rich Mountain) during the Spanish colonial era."43
Scarcely any of the profits from the intensive Spanish silver mining
ever remained in the city around the Cerro Rico site 44 and as one Boliv-
ian commentator put it, "t1like other colonized peoples, the indigenous
and later mestizo peoples of the region saw the profits from their labor
and land go to the first world, initially through monarchies, then through
corporations that stole their natural resources, captured their govern-
ments, and created local mestizo elites to do their bidding."45
Furthermore, the social impact on the region was profound: "[t]he sil-
ver and tin mining city of Potosi, Bolivia-in the 1600s richer and larger
than Paris-is now the capital of the poorest province in the poorest coun-
try in South America." 46 During the 250 years of Spanish colonial rule,
"the Spanish crown organized a migration [system] of forced labour [sic]
to the mines of Potosi which [had] ... disruptive effects on the indigenous
38. Kavitha Chekuru, Bolivia Has The Right: Nationalizing the Hydrocarbon Industry,
ABROAD VIEw, http://www.abroadview.org/latinamerica/chekuru.htm (last visited
Oct. 11, 2010).
39. Id.
40. Susumu Ogawa & Hiroyuki Kobayashi, Potosi Mining Development And The
Cause of Cultural Collapse in Bolivia, 37 INT'i ARCHIVES oF TiE PIHOTOGRAMME-
vRY, REMOTE SENSING, & SPATIAL INF7O. Scis. B8, at 143, 2008, available at http://
www.isprs.org/proceedings/XXXVII/congress/8_pdflLWG-VIII-1/25.pdf (P.R.C).
41. M. AiL7XANIRA CONTRERAS OCHOA ET AL., ReivoluTIONARY Potrncs: Bo-
LIVIA'S NE.w NATURAL REsOuRcrs PoIcY 83 (2009), available at http://www.
cedla.uva.nl/50_publications/pdflother-publications/cmp/boliviagas.pdf.
42. Ogawa & Kobayashi, supra note 40.
43. Amalia Barron, Potosi's Silver Tears, UNESCO COURIER, Mar. 2000, http://
www.unesco.orgcourier/2000_03ukidiciltxtl.htm.
44. See Chekuru, supra note 38.
45. Nancy Romer, Bolivia: Latin America's Experiment in Grassroots Democracy, 11
NEw Poirncs 44, Winter 2008, available at http://ww3.wpunj.edul-newpollissue44/
Romer44.htm.
46. Battle, supra note 7.
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communities from which they were recruited." 47 The labor system re-
quired that "every seven years, for a period of four months, all males
between 18 and 50 were ordered to work in the mines."4 8 Those forced
laborers suffered under harsh conditions, rarely seeing the light of day,
and as a result, "[e]ighty per cent of the male population of the 16 prov-
inces . . . died in these conditions." 4 9 The mining continues to this day in
unsafe and environmentally hazardous conditions "with miners effec-
tively signing away at least their health, if not their lives, as they enter the
mines for income they desperately need." 50 The desperation of those re-
maining in the region is profound: "[m]ost of the city's population of
around 120,000 are Quechua Indians, who live by scratching at what is
left in the old mines ... [without] access to modern technology .. . [or]
social security protection."51
B. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPLOITATION
After colonial imperialism came transnational corporations hoping to
extract wealth from the natural resources of backwards and underdevel-
oped South American countries, including Bolivia. Such corporations
were predominantly engaged in extractive rather than developmental in-
dustries and they brought little benefit to the native populations: "Extrac-
tive industries are those economic activities that hinge around the
withdrawal of a natural resource while making no effort to replace that
resource: either because the resource is non-renewable (hard rock miner-
als, hydrocarbons etc.) or because the agent doing the extraction is simply
uninterested in replacing the resource." 52
Transnational corporations possess significant governance power (and
the ability to abuse it) over the economies and people in poor, underde-
veloped nations like Bolivia because they have the ability to "produce
goods and services that can earn foreign exchange and create extra
jobs."53 Furthermore, such companies created a noticeable divide be-
tween the "haves" and "have-nots" in Bolivian society by rewarding
those who advanced their cause (namely government officials) at the ex-
pense of the poor majority.5 4 In fact, such corporations have the advan-
tage of sheer size, resources, and contacts with governing authorities that
give them "the capacity to sponsor candidates in local and regional elec-
47. Enrique Tandeter, Forced And Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosi, 93 PAST &
PRESENT 98, Nov. 1981.
48. Barron, supra note 43.
49. Id.
50. McAdams, supra note 6.
51. Barron, supra note 43.
52. Anthony . Bebbington et al., Extraction Inequalities And Territories in Bolivia,
Delivered at the 2009 Congress of the Latin American Studies Ass'n (LASA),
June 11-14, 2009, at 3, available at http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/an-
des/publications/reports/BebbingtonetalLASAApr2009_000.pdf.
53. JOHN MADELIiEY, BIG BUSINEsS POOR PEOPLES: THE IMPACE OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON THE WORLD'S POOR 4 (1999).
54. See Bebbington, supra note 52, at 7.
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tions . . . to assume a dominant presence in the local media, and to ...
become a sort of puppeteer in a regional political economy."55
Thus, the poor (constituting about 1.5 billion people in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America) tend to have little say in how their country is run.5 6
Transnational corporations, whose goods and services typically are
targeted at those with expendable purchasing power, indirectly increase
the inequality within host countries because the poor are unable to ex-
press their needs in the marketplace and cannot even obtain the basics
essential to their livelihood.57 Adding insult to injury is the fact that such
corporations, particularly those involved in extraction of natural re-
sources, are prone to flaunting environmental concerns and labor protec-
tions while employing the poor and indigenous who have little other
choice than to pillage and lay waste to their own land in an attempt to
maintain their impoverished existence.58
External forces, however, are not the only ones to blame for inequality
and general lack of development-"occupied" nations themselves tend to
perpetuate their position by remaining dependent upon natural resource
wealth and "rent seeking" (passive income) behavior instead of redistrib-
uting the wealth and investing it in development of other industries and
human capital.59 In Bolivia, privatization of the main industries led the
nation to "a loss of sovereignty," which turned it into a "servant of big
capital" thereby intensifying the "exploitation of [the country's] national
resources in order to increase corporate profits." 60 Because of a historic
lack of transparency in contracts between the government and large cor-
porations, it is easy for Bolivian citizens to assume they are being cheated
out of their resources and to unapologetically protest and urge the gov-
ernment to overthrow its legal obligations. 61
Now, against the backdrop of centuries of exploitation, the Bolivian
people are turning to their newfound wealth in lithium reserves with
hope:
To many Bolivians, the potential of lithium wealth represents a sym-
bolic remuneration for 500 years of natural resource looting by for-
eign corporations. Bolivian political analyst and former vice-minister
of mining, Pedro Mariobo Moreno, calls for the "state monopoly of
all the riches of the Salar of Uyuni . . . to avoid the third massive
55. Id.
56. MADELEY, supra note 53, at 6.
57. Id. at 9.
58. See Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No Recourse: Transna-
tional Corporations And The Protection of Economic, Social, And Cultural Rights
in Bolivia, 27 Foiu] ]AM INT'l L.J. 1663, 1668 (2004).
59. Barbara Hogenboom & Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto, The Political Economy of
Latin America's Extractive Industries: The State And Shifting Political Regimes,
Delivered at the 2009 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association
(LASA), June 11-14, 2009, at 14, available at http://www.cedla.uva.nl/10_about/
PDFfilesabout/Hogenboom/LASA 2009.pdf.
60. OSCAR OLIVERA, jCOCIIABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA 14 (2004).
61. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Who Owns Bolivia?, PROJECr SYNDICATE, July 5, 2006,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz7l.
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sacking of our natural resources, after silver and tin."62
In an interview with the New York Times, Sadl Villegas, head of a divi-
sion in COMIBOL that oversees lithium extraction, dismissed privatiza-
tion of lithium production, claiming: "The previous imperialist model of
exploitation of our natural resources will never be repeated in Bolivia,"
and regarding potential outside investment, he said: "[m]aybe there
could be the possibility of foreigners accepted as minority partners, or
better yet, as our clients." 63 Furthermore, Marcelo Castro, who is the
engineer overseeing the construction of the small lithium plant in the
Salar de Uyuni region, seemed guardedly hopeful for Bolivia's future
when he commented to National Public Radio that "the flow of natural
resources out of Bolivia left us poor, backwards, underdeveloped, and
dependent. Only the success of this plant can guarantee that profits will
be reinvested in our country. If not, we'll end up the same as before."M
Therefore, it seems that Bolivia's lithium industry could be the country's
prime opportunity to make up for years of lost time and economic ad-
vancement, but it also means that a significant burden rests on the shoul-
ders of President Morales and his government to bring success to their
country.
III. NATIONALIZATION OF HYDROCARBONS AND BEYOND
A. POLICIES BEHIND THE 2006 NATIONALIZATION
With an understanding of the context in which Bolivia has nationalized
many of its resource sectors in the past, the 2006 nationalization of hydro-
carbons under Supreme Decree No. 28701 is more readily appreciated.65
Specifically, the decree required the major oil companies operating in Bo-
livia (Petrobris, Repsol, and Total) to relinquish control of their field op-
erations to the country's national oil company, YPFB, and to sustain an
increase in taxes on their profits to a total of eighty-two percent or to
leave the country. 66 This action effectively turned the tables on the trans-
national corporations because policy decisions and profits now rested pri-
marily in the hands of the Bolivian government. The strong assertion of
authority over hydrocarbons is permeating to the new lithium sector as
well; "Morales is committed to ensuring that his people reap the benefits
of their natural resources. Nationalization of the lithium industry is one
option which [he] is considering in order to reach his goal." 67
62. Salt of the Earth, supra note 8.
63. Romero, supra note 3.
64. Interview by Annie Murphy with Marcelo Castro, Engineer, in Salar de Uyuni
desert, Bol. (May 11, 2009), available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/
web/2009/05/11/pm-bolivia.lithium/#.
65. See Raquel Gutierrez & Dunia Mokrani, Bolivia: Nationalization Without Expro-
priation?, Gi OBAL PoLITICIAN, June 20, 2006, http://www.globalpolitician.com/
21898-bolivia.
66. Weintraub, supra note 35.
67. Hopper, supra note 4.
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In fact, Morales has a rather ambitious agenda as he is determined to
prevent foreign companies from extracting lithium and leaving with the
profits. Instead, his aspirations include full-scale production of lithium-
ion batteries and possibly even electric cars on Bolivian soil.68 His hope
is that such an extensive industry (from extraction to production of fin-
ished products) could create numerous employment opportunities for the
Bolivian people who would finally become the primary beneficiaries of
their country's resource wealth. 69 There is typically a conflict between
the extractive industries and the resource-rich country in which they op-
erate over where such resources should be further processed; the multina-
tional firms prefer to process minerals back in the industrialized West,
while the developing countries prefer to expand local processing activities
and reap the economic benefits of doing so. 70 The primary motivators for
multinationals to process minerals back home is the fact that they already
possess the necessary refining installations there, the developing host
country usually has poor infrastructure unable to support processing ac-
tivities without a significant financial investment, and, in some cases, the
enormous political, economic, and social risks involved with committing
investment capital to the country outweigh the potential benefits.7'
Despite Morales' agenda and his dedication to nationalization, the re-
ality is that in order for him to develop his country's infrastructure and
technology required for a successful lithium industry, he must turn to pri-
vate foreign corporate investors for help. 7 2 Even given the completion of
the small government-owned lithium plant currently under construction,
for Bolivian production to reach profitable and influential levels, the
country will require substantially more development and investment.73
Bolivian economist, Juan Carlos Zuleta, stated that, "[tihere has to be
some private investment. Not only because we are a poor country, and
we don't have enough financial resources, but more important is that we
don't have the technology."74 Although the large reserves have caught
the attention and solicitations of large foreign companies and automakers
like Japan's Mitsubishi,75 many others may be hesitant for fear that after
they commit a significant investment and provide infrastructural develop-
ment Morales will simply nationalize the industry as he did with hydro-
carbons and expropriate their assets.76
68. Id.
69. McAdams, supra note 6.
70. TRANSNAnHONAL CouroRAIoNs AND THE ExeLorrAnoN OF NATURAL Ri-
souiRciis 94 (Bruce McKern & John H. Dunning, eds., 1993).
71. Id. at 100-101.
72. See McAdams, supra note 6.
73. See Romero, supra note 3.
74. Interview by Annie Murphy with Juan Carlos Zuleta, Economist, Bol. (May 11,
2009), available at http://marketpace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/05/1 1/pm-
bolivia lithium/#.
75. Id.
76. See Hopper, supra note 4.
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Foreign corporations have good reason to worry about investing in Bo-
livia; one of Morales' motivations behind nationalizing the hydrocarbons
sector in 2006 was the fact that "foreign investors received too much in
gas-sale profits based on the hydrocarbons law in place at the time."77
Even if such corporations were to partner with the Bolivian government,
they risk having the government take over their operations arbitrarily
upon a determination that they are benefitting too much from the rela-
tionship. Such fears explain why so many "private sector experts agree
that even the best-executed nationalization plans carry risks."7 8 Among
them, R. Fleischer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington believes that once a country begins a policy of nationaliza-
tion, foreign investors are quickly scared off. 7 9
Carlos Alberto L6pez, a former energy minister and consultant with
Cambridge Energy Research Associates, shares his less enthusiastic senti-
ment about Bolivia's potential in stating, "Foreign companies are afraid
to deal with a government that confiscates assets and rips up contracts . . .
Bolivia's-ideological face does not square with business and commercial
realities. I doubt lithium's potential will be realized in the short or me-
dium term."80 He further notes that following the nationalization of the
oil and gas industry, "foreign investment evaporated, production fell, and
the state-owned energy company, YPFB, became mired in corruption,"
all of which he contends hurts Bolivia's trustworthiness in the eyes of
potential investors.81 Part of the problem stems from the fact that YPFB
was a de-capitalized company (thus unable to finance its activities); in
order to capitalize it to gain the resources necessary to take absolute con-
trol of the hydrocarbons industry, Bolivia had to de-capitalize foreign
companies by increasing the appropriation of revenues from the hydro-
carbons industry that go to the state. This capitalization, in turn, discour-
aged foreign investment in the nation.8 2
One counterargument to the negative assertions above is the fact that
Bolivia's actions reflect an emerging if not prevalent regional attitude
rather than an isolated choice by the country: "around the world, devel-
oping countries are throwing off colonial overlords and nationalizing in-
77. Carin Zissis, Bolivia's Nationalization of Oil and Gas, BACKoROUNDER, May 12,
2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10682/.
78. Jaroslaw Anders, Latin American Nationalization Trend Seen Hindering Progress,
USINFO, Jan. 16, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/January/
20070116154839zjsrednaO.6983454.html.
79. Id.
80. Rory Carroll & Andres Schipani, Multinationals Eye Up Lithium Reserves Beneath
Bolivia's Salt Flats, GUARDIAN, June 17, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2009/jun/17/bolivia-lithiurn-reserves-electric-cars.
81. Id.
82. See Roberto Chacon de Albuquerque, The Disappropriation of Foreign Compa-
nies Involved in The Exploration, Exploitation And Commercialization of Hydro-
carbons in Bolivia, 14 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 21, 23 (2008).
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dustries to return some of the profits to the citizens."83 The systemic
move to nationalize could leave foreign investors with little choice but to
enter relationships with headstrong but resource-rich countries:
And this time, the leaders of these countries are not about to see
their resources go straight into the hands of the Americans. Vene-
zuela nationalized its oil, and other countries on the continent have
been not-so-quietly expelling companies who exploited them
through deals made with puppet dictators or through coercion. 84
Perhaps Bolivia's turn to nationalization is less about "getting back" at
foreign corporations than it is about asserting control over the country's
remaining natural resources in order to "promote much needed develop-
ment" and economic growth.85 Bolivia could be taking these steps now
when the country has the rare opportunity and ability to learn to stand on
its own and claim its position at the league tables of powerful resource-
rich nations by strengthening and protecting its national sovereignty
through the "recuperation of a certain decision-making autonomy of the
Bolivian state, which in the previous administrations was completely sub-
ordinated to outside interests and designs." 86
Despite Bolivia's Constitution claiming all hydrocarbons as property of
the state, prior weaker administrations bent to the will of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and granted various concessions to U.S. and
European oil and gas corporations in the mid-1990s.87 Rather than help
the country advance, such concessions failed to relieve the Bolivian peo-
ple's severe poverty, and thus Morales' choice to nationalize reflects a
growing awareness in the importance of corporate social responsibility-
if the companies fail to take into account and mitigate the impact of their
actions, they will be forcibly removed.88 At the very least, even if all
positive reasons are discounted, "hydrocarbons are in high demand and
this might help disguise or at least mitigate the severity of the negative
message Bolivia has sent to foreign investors, and tempt new investment
to test the waters."89
From President Morales' perspective, not only were his actions in-
tended to help his people, but they were necessary for political survival-
his predecessors were pushed out of office over the issue of nationaliza-




85. See Nadia Martinez, Bolivia's Nationalization: Understanding The Process And
Gauging the Results, INsT. Po'y SruDims, Aug. 2007, http://www.wola.org/bolivial
IPS%20Nationalization%2008.07.pdf.
86. Gutierrez & Mokrani, supra note 65.
87. Martinez, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Jova, supra note 34, at 17.
BOLIVIA, BATTERIES & BUREAUCRACY
tion.90 Thus, in issuing Supreme Decree No. 28701, President Morales
intended to annul the "transnational contracts that had been put into
place under President Sanchez de Lozada's capitalization process of the
late 90s."91 Furthermore, Morales, unlike prior administrations, actually
has ambitious and specific plans for the use of his country's resource prof-
its, primarily 1) reinvesting in job creation to begin to raise the country
out of extreme poverty and 2) educating his citizens to best position and
strengthen them and future generations of Bolivians.92
B. LEGALITY OF THE 2006 NATIONALIZATION
In terms of the legality of Bolivia's annulment of contracts, the 2006
nationalization was touted as "nationalization without expropriation,"
meaning that the country was not depriving the foreign corporations of
any actual property right and in fact left the corporations in place as oper-
ators of the facilities. 93 This action falls squarely within one of three
traditional theories of appropriation: 1) state monopoly and appropria-
tion of all revenues through a state-owned company (i.e. Saudi Aramco);
2) coexistence between private companies (whose revenues are taxed by
the state) and a state-owned company (like Bolivia's 2006 nationaliza-
tion); and 3) exploration and exploitation of the natural resources only by
private companies but with hefty state-imposed taxes and royalties on
their revenues (the U.S. method).94 Bolivia's primary argument is that
the foreign corporations never owned any property rights as to the hydro-
carbons to begin with and therefore no purchase transaction was required
to legally transfer assets from the corporations to the state:
It might seem incredible to many that national resources were ...
transferred from the public to the private sector without any type of
sale, but this is exactly what happened. There was no sale, so now
there is no expropriation. If one reviews the press and the laws
passed during 1995 and 1996 in Bolivia it is clear that this was the
peculiar mechanism of privatization devised in that country to trans-
fer public wealth, national resources, and the state investment accu-
mulated in the thirty years prior to 1990 directly to the private sector.
[emphasis added]95
Aside from what appears to be a "lack of consideration" argument, the
public refusal to honor government contracts also stems from a feeling of
unfair dealing and fraud because the government, without the legally re-
quired approval from Congress, agreed to long-term fixed price capitali-
zation contracts without stipulating how and when taxes were to be paid
90. See Raul Zibechi, After Bolivia's Gas Nationalization-Toward a New Regional
Map, GLOBAL Poi11riCIAN, June 2, 2006, http:Ilwww.globalpolitician.com/21827-
bolivia.
91. Jova, supra note 34, at 5.
92. OCHOA, supra note 41, at 91-92.
93. Jova, supra note 34, at 6.
94. Albuquerque, supra note 82, at 23-24.
95. Gutierrez & Mokrani, supra note 65.
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by foreign corporations.96 Bolivia settled on the option of nullifying con-
tracts, saying they are against constitutional provisions that require prior
congressional approval as an alternative to the more expensive option of
buying out the foreign corporations under an eminent domain theory of
taking their property for public use or the less certain option of closely
scouring the contracts to find an unmet condition upon which to base a
rescission. 97 In addition to arguing that without congressional approval
the privatization contracts were void, a third assertion is that such con-
tracts, even if approved, directly contradicted the language of article 139
of the constitution, stating that hydrocarbons are the property of the
state, and therefore could not be legally privatized. 98
Given the multitude of historic, social, and legal reasons for nationaliz-
ing, what remains clear is the fact that Bolivia is determined to take a
stand and make up for centuries of abuse and repression at the hands of
internal and external forces. This mentality has already colored the dis-
cussions surrounding lithium extraction and development, but it also
seems likely that the Bolivian people are cautiously willing to accept for-
eign partners so long as their due share is secured. Without the support
of the Bolivian people, foreign corporations will lose their potential to
develop one of the greatest sources of lithium for the future, and without
the trust and investment of foreign corporations, the Bolivian people will
remain underdeveloped and poverty-stricken.
IV. THE NEW BOLIVIAN CONSTITUTION
A. THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION GETS ITS DUE
The election of President Evo Morales is significant not only because of
his unprecedented dedication to walking a hard line internationally, but
because of his unique status of being the first indigenous president in
Bolivia's history. 99 One of the primary campaign promises that vaulted
him to the position was a promise to reform the country's constitution in
order to bring greater social and political rights to the country's indige-
nous majority.'oo And reform he did: "Morales staged an historic refer-
endum in February 2009 that called for land redistribution of the holdings
of the country's powerful European-descended minority in favor of its
indigenous majority."101 The most crucial aspect of this reform is that it
grants control over natural resources existing within indigenous territo-
ries to the people living there.102 The significance of such control is that
it allows indigenous populations to govern the types of concessions they
96. See Jova, supra note 34, at 12.
97. See Albuquerque, supra note 82, at 27-29.
98. Jova, supra note 34, at 12.
99. Freymann, supra note 83.
100. Spencer Spratley, Canadian Perspective: America's Pursues Ongoing Interference
in Latin America, WoRo PREss NETWORK, June 11, 2008, http://worldpress-
network.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f= 2&t= 27 3.
101. Lucky Bolivia, supra note 20.
102. Hogenboom & Jilberto, supra note 59, at 11.
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will give for resource extraction, if at all.103 While such changes did not
earn Morales the hearts of the country's largely European elite, his inten-
tions were to compensate the indigenous majority for the various en-
croachments and injustices they suffered over the country's history.104
Those encroachments by transnational corporations and the country's
elites left the indigenous population displaced and impoverished.1 0 5
In recognition of the country's diverse population, the new constitution
declares Bolivia as "pluri-national" in order to acknowledge the presence
of over thirty different indigenous nations.106 In addition to such recogni-
tion, the constitution goes further by creating a new Congress that specifi-
cally reserves a number of seats for the indigenous groups thereby giving
them unprecedented official representation and say in the government.10 7
Such changes, while drastic for the non-indigenous population, are not
surprising given that "Bolivia's campesino, indigenous and original peo-
ples (pueblos originarios) make up 60 percent of the country's 8.8 million
population." 08 Furthermore, recognizing indigenous rights within the
country parallels a global trend.
The Bolivian Constitution cements some of the rights outlined in the
2007 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which sup-
ports indigenous self-government and self-determination. Article 289 of
the constitution stipulates, "Rural indigenous autonomy consists of self-
government and the exercise of self-determination for rural indigenous
nations and native peoples who share territory, culture, history, language,
and unique forms of juridical, political, social, and economic
organization." 09
The new provisions even allow the indigenous groups to create their
own statutes for their autonomous territories (provided they comport
with the other laws of the state and other constitutional provisions) and
to govern their own development by managing their natural resources
and by levying and re-distributing taxes.110 Inclusion of indigenous rep-
resentation even extends to the judicial system since the constitution pro-
vides for a "new indigenous judicial system, at the same level of ordinary
justice, along with a new Plurinational Constitutional Court which will
have to elect new members for both systems.""' Most important to the
present analysis are the provisions regarding natural resources; in some
103. Romero, supra note 3.
104. See Freymann, supra note 83.
105. Romer, supra note 45.
106. Alex van Schaick, Bolivia's New Constitution, NORTI AMERICAN CONGRESS ON
LATIN AMERICA, Jan. 21, 2009, https://nacla.org/node/5437.
107. Mauricio Ipifia Nagel, The Bolivian Legal System And Legal Research,
GLOBALEX, Dec. 2009, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/bolivia.htm.
108. Susan Healey, Cultural Resilience, Identity And The Restructuring of Political
Power in Bolivia, Presented at the 11th Biennial Conf. of Int'l Ass'n for the Study
of Common Prop., Bali, Indon. (June 19-23, 2006), at 2, available at http://
www.indiana.edul-iascp/bali/papers/Healey-susan.pdf.
109. Van Schaick, supra note 106.
110. Id.
111. Nagel, supra note 107.
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cases the indigenous population is granted full control over any such re-
sources in their territories and in others they are at least guaranteed the
right to be consulted about the nature of extraction and entitlement to
share in the economic benefits of that extraction.1 12
While the constitutional changes appear drastic, the creation of in-
creased indigenous authority may have been viewed as a way to repair
former grants of rights that have gone largely unfulfilled-by placing con-
trol in the hands of the indigenous groups and allowing them representa-
tion in the government, they will be better able to police and enforce
their own rights. A 2007 U.N. Special Report on human rights and free-
doms of indigenous peoples highlighted the fact that, despite provisions
in the constitutions of many countries that provide for inalienable rights
to and titling procedures for gaining ownership of land, the process has
been slow and largely ignored, especially in Bolivia. "[By] 2005, the in-
digenous Aymara people in Bolivia-which make up sixty to eighty per-
cent of the total population-had filed land claims covering 143,000
square miles, but due to the slow, under-funded titling process, only
19,300 miles had been granted by the end of 2006."113
Even more discouraging is that in many countries, despite specific de-
marcation of indigenous lands, resource extraction and encroachment by
transnational industries has gone largely unchecked, particularly in the
mining and logging industries. 114 The U.N. has noted the significance of
such abuses because of the fact that "the majority of the world's remain-
ing natural resources-minerals, freshwater, potential energy sources and
more-are found within indigenous peoples' territories."' 15 In an effort
to combat flagrant disregard for indigenous rights, the new Bolivian Con-
stitution puts the power in the hands of those most affected, and thus
transnational corporations in Bolivia can expect increased scrutiny over
current and potential operations within the country.
B. REAFFIRMATION OF NATIONAL OWNERSHIP OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
In addition to improving the rights of the indigenous population, the
new constitution also reasserts Bolivia's right to the full benefit of its nat-
ural resources under article 349. "Natural resources are the inalienable
and indivisible property and direct dominion of the Bolivian people and
will be administrated, in the collective interest, by the State."" 6 It fur-
ther specifies that the state oil and gas company, YPFB, is in charge of
112. Jos6 Aylwin, Land and Resources, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., 30.4 (Winter 2006),
available at http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quar-
terly/joseacute-aylwin/land-and-resources.
113. Indigenous Peoples-Lands, Territories, And Natural Resources, U.N. PERMANENT
FORUM ON IND)IGENOUS ISSUES, available at http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/unpfii/
documents/6_session factsheetl.pdf.
114. Aylwin, supra note 112.
115. Indigenous Peoples, supra note 113.
116. Van Schaick, supra note 106.
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the entire productive chain with authority to enter contracts with private
companies to engage in oil and gas production as well.'" 7 Apart from
specific contracts with private organizations, all remaining profits from
natural resources are considered property of the state.118 Article 359 is
more specific, discussing hydrocarbons in particular, and reaffirming that
they "are the inalienable and imprescriptible property of Bolivians" and
that, on behalf of its citizens, the government "exercises the property
rights over all hydrocarbon production in the country and only it is au-
thorized to carry out its marketing."" 9
It is interesting to note that the constitution specifically stipulates con-
trol over hydrocarbons, but fails to mention lithium resources. Perhaps
Morales and the Bolivian government assumed control over lithium
would fall under the more general article 349 provisions governing natu-
ral resources as a whole. Alternatively, the specific provisions of article
359 could simply be a result of the relatively volatile history of hydrocar-
bon management as a way of ensuring Bolivian control for the future. A
third (and the most likely) possibility is that Morales did not want to fore-
close all opportunities for gaining foreign investment in developing the
lithium industry and therefore did not specifically target it in the constitu-
tion so as to avoid the appearance of an overbearing government, unwill-
ing to yield benefits to private actors.
Asserting control over natural resources is crucial to Morales' develop-
mental goals for his country.12 0 By capitalizing on Bolivia's natural
wealth, Morales can presumably increase living standards for his people
while gaining international recognition as a major resource supplier, the
benefits of which are already accruing even without a developed lithium
industry. "Bolivia's mining industry was producing significant gains for
the country, leading to a 9.4 [percent] increase in its GDP, as reported in
early 2008."121 Such positive indicators could signal the start of a much-
needed reversal in the fortunes of a country that, until recently, did not
have the political strength to overcome its instability. "Bolivia is typical
of the world's poorest countries, where the management of resources es-
sential to sustain economic development has suffered serious neglect."1 2 2
The fortified strength of the government under the new constitution
should drastically improve control over the natural resources that are a
key aspect of internal development "especially for indigenous and peas-
ant groups that cannot easily benefit from the international economic sys-
tem."123 Opponents of nationalization frequently criticize the system for
117. Id.
118. Nagel, supra note 107.
119. Id.
120. See World Bank Indep. Evaluation Group, Natural Resources Management in Bo-
livia, http://Inweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJava
Searchl443BAEC06DB35A26852567F5005D8501 (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
121. Lucky Bolivia, supra note 20.
122. World Bank Indep. Evaluation Group, supra note 120.
123. OCFOA, supra note 41, at 93.
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failing to allow the capitalist system to run its course by allowing strong-
armed governments to manipulate and control markets, however:
If things were left purely to the momentum of economic forces-the
so-called logic of the market that is nothing more than the logic of
the transnationals-the result would be a type of integration that
would continue producing marginalization and poverty in every
country and accentuating the inequalities between rich countries and
poor countries.12 4
The increased control of the government is not solely a power-grab by
the elite politicians either; much of the impetus and support for the new
constitutional provisions came from the Bolivian people themselves, and
as Francisco Quisbert (leader of a group of salt gatherers in the Salar de
Uyuni, known as Fructas) said in an interview with the New York Times:
"We know that Bolivia can become the Saudi Arabia of lithium . . . we
are poor, but we are not stupid peasants. The lithium may be Bolivia's,
but it is also our property." 12 5 The alignment of sentiments between the
national government and the Bolivian people will most likely color the
execution of future plans for the country's lithium resources, but before
jumping into a full-scale development project, they would be best-served
to learn from the rise to economic and resource prowess of an unlikely,
but surprisingly similarly situated nation, Saudi Arabia.
V. AN UNLIKELY ROLE MODEL: SAUDI ARABIA
A. AN ALTERNATIVE TO NATIONALIZATION:
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS
Bolivia's dilemma, that it possesses vast reserves of valuable lithium
without the capital or infrastructure to properly extract it, is similar to the
one Saudi Arabia, the country that possesses the world's largest oil
reserves, faced during the 1930s.126 The development of the now-boom-
ing oil industry in Saudi Arabia was a direct result of significant foreign
investment. In the 1930s, when Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) dis-
covered oil in the nation after winning concessions from the government,
the country was capital-poor and undeveloped, thus unable to provide the
necessary investment to create an oil industry to exploit the valuable re-
source. 127 In fact, "prior to World War II, [Saudi Arabia] was one of the
poorest [countries] on earth." 1 2 8 Foreign investment in Saudi Arabia was
particularly important for its oil industry since "the problems of oil pro-
duction . .. have always been the high sums of money needed for invest-
ment, the need for using the latest technology and the high risk and
124. Zibechi, supra note 90.
125. Romero, supra note 3.
126. See Au D. JOIIANY, IT AL, T7e SAUDI ARAIAN ECONOMY 30 (1986).
127. Lucky Bolivia, supra note 20.
128. TIE GOVIERNMENT AND Potrncs on Ti-n Minoui EAST AND Nowni AFRICA 85
(David E. Long & Bernard Reich, eds., 4th ed. 2002).
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uncertainty involved mainly in the exploration phase."129 The extent of
oil production operations in Saudi Arabia quickly grew as SOCAL gave
way to a series of other cross-company partnerships (later known as the
Arabian American Oil Company-ARAMCO) when it sold part of its
interest to Texaco in 1936, which was then joined by today's Exxon-Mobil
in 1946 "to gain investment capital and marketing outlets for the large
reserves being discovered in Saudi Arabia."130
The initial ownership of ARAMCO was divided wholly between those
four companies with Mobil taking ten percent and the remaining three
each owning thirty percent.' 3 ' Through significant foresight, the Saudi
government managed to secure its future place at the helm of the oil in-
dustry by negotiating a gradual buyout process for ARAMCO known as
"participation."1 3 2 The Saudi government recognized that without main-
taining involvement of the oil companies (if it chose to implement a tradi-
tional nationalization), the oil-producing countries would engage in
pricing battles that could collapse the global market. 133 In 1950, Saudi
Arabia negotiated a fifty-fifty profit sharing agreement whereby the gov-
ernment would tax each barrel of oil produced by ARAMCO, which led
to a significant increase in the country's tax revenues.134 In 1972, under
what was termed the "General Agreement," Saudi Arabia continued to
incrementally nationalize ARAMCO through participation purchases, in-
itially beginning with a twenty-five percent share in the company with a
five percent annual increase until a fifty-one percent holding by 1983; this
would prevent "a precipitous nationalization" while laying "the ground-
work for cooperation between the American and Saudi owners based on
common business interests, such as maintaining stable markets and sup-
ply."'35 The agreement was modified periodically and by the end of the
1980s, Saudi Arabia had officially repurchased all of ARAMCO's (now
renamed Saudi Aramco) assets and was the oil conglomerate's sole
owner.136
The importance of this repurchase process in the context of Bolivia is
that Saudi Arabia started out in a similar situation of possessing a vast
wealth of natural resources that the country could not afford to develop
into a profitable economic sector on its own-much as Bolivia is unable
to get its lithium industry on a global production level without significant
129. SHIUKRI M. GIANEM, OPEC: Tim RISE AND FALL OF AN EXCLUSIVE CLUI3 4
(1986).
130. See HELEN CHAPIN METz, SAuDI ARABIA: A COUNTRY STuDy (1992), available at
http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabia/.
131. GHANEM, supra note 129, at 10.
132. THE GOVERNMENT AND Potrncs oi, THE MIDDILE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,
supra note 128, at 85.
133. Id.
134. MEZr, supra note 130.
135. Amy Myers Jaffe & Jareer Elass, Saudi Aramco: National Flagship With Global
Responsibilities, JAMEs A. BAKER III INST. F7OR PUn. PotIcy, 38 (Mar. 2007),
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136. Id. at 39.
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outside aid.137 Saudi Arabia provides an excellent example for Bolivia
because it obtained the necessary investment to get oil production off the
ground, but managed to resist selling out its entire national resource
wealth to foreigners by devising a clever method of regaining control of
its assets over time. For a country like Bolivia, whose history is plagued
with exploitation by such outside investors, taking a close look at how the
Saudi government structured such a deal is crucial to ensuring the suc-
cessful and profitable development of its lithium resources.
In order to effectively develop lithium production into a profitable,
high-volume industry while maintaining a beneficial stake in the profits, it
seems Bolivia should take steps to encourage outside investment and
partnerships with a similar "participation" plan as Saudi Arabia executed
during its fledgling years. The Bolivian government should also consider
downplaying its nationalistic tendencies and realize that there are equally
viable options that will bring wealth and improved standards of living to
its people without polarizing foreign investors. The Saudi government
carefully avoided a bare nationalization of ARAMCO after it realized
the crucial role that foreign oil companies played in keeping the oil mar-
ket stable and profitable. The Bolivian government needs to recognize
the substantially similar position it is in and quell its population's rancor-
ous language concerning nationalization and the dissolution of contracts
with private corporations. Without the aid of such corporations, it seems
highly unlikely that Bolivian lithium production will be relevant, if it suc-
ceeds at all.
The best plan is for the government to draft an agreement as a precur-
sor to allowing any external aid in which the government specifies how it
will maintain an ownership stake in any joint venture with foreign mul-
tinational companies and that it will retain options or rights to repurchase
the remaining shares over time. To encourage investment, the govern-
ment should specify limits on its ability to repurchase all of the outstand-
ing assets-either that it would be unable to do so before a specified date
or before its foreign partners had recouped their initial investments or
booked a specified profit. Furthermore, the Bolivian government will
have to devise a reasonable share repurchase rate because unlike Saudi
Arabia, Bolivia has a history of breaching contracts and misappropriating
foreign companies, and thus it will have to tread lightly to encourage
transnational corporations to trust the government and will be unable to
engage in as aggressive a share repurchase process as Saudi Arabia con-
ducted. With such a "participation" agreement, Bolivia could ensure its
involvement in its lithium production industry despite the country's need
for foreign-sourced capital and infrastructural development.
137. See Lucky Bolivia, supra note 20.
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B. SHOULD BOLIVIA CREATE ITS OWN OPEC?
Another factor that greatly aided Saudi Arabia's development and the
success of the oil market as a whole for oil-producing nations was the
creation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in 1960 between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Vene-
zuela.138 This structure is another that, if successfully mimicked by Bo-
livia and other lithium-producing nations, could lead to a stable and
profitable market for the metal. OPEC was a necessary response by oil-
producing nations to check the pricing pressures of transnational oil com-
panies (those same companies that provided the necessary initial invest-
ment to get the industry off the ground) and other threats to the
producing nations' welfares.139 OPEC represents the collective interests
of oil-producing nations (much like a labor union, but for countries) and
has four primary defining characteristics:
1) OPEC is an intergovernmental organization restricted exclusively
to countries heavily dependent on oil exports for foreign exchange
and economic development; 2) membership is in practice limited to
developing countries; 3) decisions are reached by a ministerial con-
ference, require a unanimous vote, and are subject to approval of all
member governments; 4) political matters are at least formally
outside the scope and purview of the organization. 14 0
Surprisingly, it did not take long for the organization to have a benefi-
cial impact for member countries: "at the moment of its inception, OPEC
managed to halt additional attempts to reduce oil's posted price."1 41
Article 2 of OPEC's guiding statute sets forth that its main purpose is
to unify and stabilize oil prices between member countries, to ensure a
stable income from oil production to those countries, and to ensure a
regular supply of oil to consuming countries.142 The most interesting pro-
vision, however, is in article 2(c), which states that one of the functions of
the organization is to give "due regard . . . to . . . a fair return on their
capital to those investing in the petroleum industry." 43 While awkwardly
phrased, this provision essentially declares that not only will OPEC pro-
tect member-nations, but it will also operate to ensure that those partici-
pating in the oil industry (the foreign oil companies) will receive a "fair
return" on investment. This provision was probably included to reduce
the threat that OPEC posed to the multinational oil companies-while
other provisions set boundaries to protect the interests of OPEC mem-
bers, this provision specifically extends an olive branch in asserting that
138. JOHJANY, supra note 126, at 50.
139. Zuhayr Mikdashi, The Opec Process, 104 DAEDALUs 203, 205 (1975).
140. Id. at 206.
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142. Org. of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Statute, ch. 1, art. 2, (2008),
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non-member investors can expect fair treatment and thus encourages
continued partnership and investment in the oil industry.
Despite unification under OPEC, a number of differences continue to
cause tension between member countries mainly due to unequal alloca-
tion of natural resources and correspondingly varied policy interests. For
example, while Saudi Arabia is interested in maintaining moderate price
levels to ensure the long-term value of its vast reserves, a country with a
smaller endowment of oil would want higher prices to maximize its return
over its shorter production horizon. 1 4 4 A further area of disunity is the
proper role for national oil enterprises in member countries-whether
they are to become proper transnational companies or remain agents of
the national governments focused primarily on domestic development. 145
Even with their assorted differences, however, the OPEC members con-
tinue in their joint relationship, realizing that "unless they remain to-
gether on the oil-pricing issue, they may well fail separately, and that
their protagonists, the industrial powers and major companies, will regain
the power they had over the oil industry until recently."1 4 6
Article 3 of the OPEC statute reflects the desire for members to coop-
erate despite differences by providing that"[t]he Organization shall be
guided by the principle of the sovereign equality of its Member Countries
... [who] shall fulfill, in good faith, [their] obligations ... in accordance
with this Statute [emphasis added]."147 This article means that despite
inequalities in distribution of oil resources and wealth, each member of
OPEC is considered an equal of the others thus mitigating the threat of
the more powerful members (Saudi Arabia) from setting the agenda and
policies of the organization over the protests of weaker members (Vene-
zuela). In addition, the language of "good faith" in the second clause of
the article also addresses the guarantee of a fair return for non-member
investors under the above-mentioned provisions of article 2. It effectively
prohibits a member nation from breaching the guarantee by taking a
drastic step contrary to an investor's interests, such as nationalization,
which is unlikely to classify as a "good faith" action under the statute.
The OPEC statute does not specifically provide for sanctions against a
member country if it should breach any of the statutory provisions, how-
ever, the power to impose sanctions seems to be indirectly proposed
under article 4. Article 4 provides: "If, as a result of the application of
any decision of the Organization, sanctions are employed, directly or in-
directly, by any interested company or companies against one or more
Member Countries ... [emphasis added]."1 4 8 The language of the provi-
sion suggests that the OPEC members cannot themselves enforce sanc-
tions, but may issue a decision leading a non-member corporation to
144. MIKDASI, supra note 139, at 209.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 210.
147. OPEC Statute art. 3.
148. Id. art. 4.
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impose sanctions on its own accord. The remainder of the provision clari-
fies that it is not actually meant as a grant of sanctioning power, but as a
guard against the potential contradiction of a decision by the members as
a result of a corporation imposing sanctions against one member for the
benefit of another:
[N]o other Member shall accept any offer of a beneficial treatment,
whether in the form of an increase in oil exports or in an improve-
ment in prices, which may be made to it by such interested company
or companies with the intention of discouraging the application of
the decision of the Organization.14 9
Thus, rather than providing for some inherent sanction power, the stat-
ute instead establishes that in the event a non-member imposes sanctions
against a member, no other member may profit from those sanctions or
go against the collective interest of the organization. This stipulation
seems to further address the general policy of cohesion and cooperation
between members, recognizing that allowing members to profit from the
misfortunes of another would be divisive and undermine the unified in-
terests that the organization seeks to protect.
A final interesting aspect of the organization is the quasi-democratic
nature of its structure despite the fact that most member countries do not
themselves embrace any form of democracy in their own respective gov-
ernments. The organization is divided into three main components: a
Conference, a Board of Governors, and a Secretariat. 5 0 The Conference
is essentially the legislative body of the organization whose primary role
is to set the general policies and methods for implementing them, to
adopt the budget, to amend the statute, and to conduct other common
policymaking functions.' 5 ' The Board of Governors, on the other hand,
plays an executive oversight function (more along the lines of a board of
directors in a corporation) directing the management of the affairs of the
organization, implementing decisions by the Conference, and making rec-
ommendations to the Conference regarding policies and drawing up the
budget for the organization.15 2 Finally, in addition to the Board of Gov-
ernors, the Secretariat is also charged with an executive role that is
subordinate to the board, but contains the legally authorized representa-
tive of the organization, the Secretary General (like the CEO of a corpo-
ration), who is appointed from one of the member countries for a three-
year term.153 The structure of OPEC seems like it is intended to establish
a distribution of powers and division of labor, which also supports the
ever-important cooperative bond between the member countries and pre-
vents any one member from exercising too much control or authority
over the others.
149. Id.
150. Id. art. 9.
151. Id. art. 15.
152. Id. art. 20.
153. Id. arts. 25-27.
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After garnering foreign corporate investment to help get its lithium in-
dustry to become a regular supplier to the market, it seems that Bolivia
would greatly benefit from taking a page out of the Saudi Arabian
playbook by creating an organization similar to OPEC (perhaps the Or-
ganization of the Lithium Exporting Countries-OLEC) jointly with Ti-
bet, Mexico, and the other South American lithium producers. The goals
of creating such a joint venture with the other lithium producers would be
similar to those that instigated the creation of OPEC in the 1960s, namely
a need for a unified front against pricing pressures and for a self-regu-
lated production and supply schedule to stabilize prices and ensure regu-
lar income to each member. Structurally, an organization between
lithium producing countries would be best served to adopt a similar divi-
sion of powers that exists under the OPEC Statute. A separation of pow-
ers is important to ensure no single member becomes too powerful or
abusive of the policies.
While it is unlikely that Bolivia could currently exert enough influence
to instigate the creation of such an organization, after a few years of pro-
ducing and supplying the market with its lithium, being the country with
the largest known reserves, it would be best suited to lead the charge
towards protecting the market for its valuable resource. Furthermore, if
Bolivia could somehow currently convince the other lithium producing
countries to join such an organization and to adopt a statute containing
provisions similar to the OPEC Statute that protect outside investor cor-
porations participating in the industry, Bolivia could potentially solve its
issues with convincing transnational companies to invest in lithium ex-
traction and production infrastructure within the country. Those compa-
nies would be statutorily protected for a "reasonable return on their
investments" and, should Bolivia violate those terms, the corporations
could impose sanctions against its production.
To add further assurances to convince foreign corporations to invest
despite Bolivia's recent trend toward nationalization, the organization
should include its own provisions for censuring member countries that
breach the statutory language and provide sanctioning power by one of
the arms of the organization. In order to effectively hear grievances by
non-member corporations and render decisions when issues arise over
the conduct of a member nation, Bolivia and its peers should also con-
sider adding a pseudo-judicial arm or tribunal that could more effectively
interpret and apply the statutory language governing their organization.
Such a tribunal could be composed of a rotating group of representatives
from member nations to ensure a fair representation of each individual's
interests and interpretation of the statute.
A strong statutory structure and protections like those proposed above
would hopefully overshadow Bolivia's history and recent reprise of na-
tionalistic tendencies that chill foreign investment. With stronger protec-
tions for foreign corporations, they would be more inclined to feel
confident that they could profitably invest in Bolivia's lithium production
infrastructure without facing a sudden seizure of assets in a governmental
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nationalization. Clearly, Bolivia would benefit from such protective pro-
visions as well because outside foreign investment is crucial to the coun-
try's ability to become a major member of the lithium production market.
Therefore, a central organization of lithium producers governed by a
strong statute seems like an excellent option for Bolivia and its peers to
consider as the lithium market grows. Aside from helping countries like
Bolivia obtain the necessary initial investment and eventual negotiated
repurchase agreements with transnational lithium extracting companies,
such an organization would add a further level of protection for Bolivia
and fellow member countries by regulating the prices and supply of lith-
ium on the market to avoid misalignment of supply or demand.
C. AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF A RENTIER STATE
Before Bolivia proceeds to mimic Saudi Arabia in the hopes of becom-
ing as wealthy and powerful, the country should take heed of the indirect
negative effects of a government suddenly becoming the collector and
redistributor of natural resource wealth. During the oil boom, Saudi Ara-
bia transformed into what is commonly termed a "rentier state:" the gov-
ernment collected economic "rents" from the profits of the extractive oil
industry and then became a "source of wealth domestically as one of its
primary functions [became] that of distributor ... [a] patron of both the
economy and of society." 154 Rentier states are defined by the fact that
their primary income is based purely on the extraction of natural re-
sources rather than from some actual capital-producing function, and that
without such rents, the state would be a deficit economy.155 Further-
more, in their extraction of natural resources, rentier states employ a
small percentage of the indigenous population because "the technology
required for the profitable extraction of the natural resources is predomi-
nantly in the hands of foreigners."15 6 With all rents concentrated in the
hands of the government, the state becomes a distributor of economic
benefits, which it uses as a continuing source of legitimacy to advance
other agendas as it no longer depends on taxation and thus has no politi-
cal accountability. 5 7
As a financially independent entity not dependent on taxation, the
Saudi Arabian rentier-state gave rise to a controlling elite bureaucratic
business class based on family connections, favoritism, and excessive
wastage with the ability to "buy off" any potential opposition.'58 The
various social provisions (medical care, education, food subsidies) making
Saudi Arabia a "welfare state" have evolved into a "social contract"
whereby the state provides and the people bite their tongues against its
154. CH1AMPON, supra note 1, at 9.
155. Abdelrahman Al-Hegelan & Monte Palmer, Bureaucracy And Development in
Saudi Arabia, 39 Minous EAST J. 48, 48-49 (1985).
156. Id.
157. Gwenn Okruhlik, Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, And The Rise of Opposition: The
Political Economy of Oil States, 31 CoM. Pou-rics 295, 296 (1999).
158. CHAMPION, supra note 1, at 81.
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frequent abuses of power. 159 Distribution is not an entirely effective tool
for silencing the masses, however, for the inequitable distribution of
wealth is cause for dissent because "the prosperity of private citizens is
dependent upon . . . access to contracts, information, jobs in the public
sector or infrastructure governed by family relations, friendship, religious
branch, and regional affiliation." 16 0
When the government plays a central role in distributing economic
rents, it is independent of its untaxed citizens who benefit from the wel-
fare of the state and thus who "have little incentive and no effective
mechanism by which to hold the government accountable." 16 1 While
there are a number of proposed methods of mitigating this disconnect
between governments and their people, the most effective solution would
be direct distribution of revenues or interest from the extraction of natu-
ral resources to the people themselves. 162 Although distribution to all
citizens poses some logistical challenges, especially for developing coun-
tries, it is not impossible and has been done in Bolivia previously with
direct distribution of pension returns from private enterprise to senior
citizens-the advantage being that such a system prevents natural re-
source profits from passing through the hands of public officials prone to
corruption and misappropriation. 163
Therefore, with the potential rise of a booming lithium industry that
would bring much economic and social success to Bolivia, the govern-
ment and its people should be wary of transforming into a welfare state
or rentier-state whose primary function would become distribution of ec-
onomic rents from its extractive industries to its people. While the popu-
lation would certainly benefit from an improved standard of living, the
lack of accountability that comes with a government running a constant
budget surplus is risky to human rights and democracy, especially in a
region where political corruption and improper influence is abundant.
Bolivia should strongly consider a system of direct distribution of the
economic rents to its people to avoid exposing the country's newfound
wealth to misappropriation by political officials. The potential benefits of
a direct distribution system would be threefold: 1) it would drastically
improve the standard of living for each and every Bolivian; 2) with in-
creased capital wealth, those citizens would have the ability to reinvest in
the country's economic development through various business pursuits;
and 3) the government would remain accountable to its citizen body since
it would still have to raise taxes in order to function. With foresight to-
wards avoiding the pitfalls that have arisen in Saudi Arabia, Bolivia
would maximize the beneficial effect of its lithium industry profits.
159. Id. at 82.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Lithium extraction, production, and development have strong potential
to raise Bolivian society out of the economic and social rut that has
plagued the nation since colonial times. While in recent history the Bo-
livian government has favored a policy of nationalization of various natu-
ral resource industries in an effort to keep some of the profitability and
wealth within the country, the current leadership under Evo Morales
should pursue an alternative strategy for the development of the coun-
try's lithium industry. Threats of nationalization and misappropriation do
not encourage transnational corporations and foreign investors to feel se-
cure about helping the country develop the infrastructure necessary for a
thriving lithium industry, but without such outside investment, Bolivia
will be unable to exploit the full potential of its resource wealth and will
run the risk of missing its window to join other lithium producing coun-
tries as a major supplier to the global market.
To fully realize the benefits of its wealth of lithium resources, Bolivia
will have to make some important concessions at the start. By following
the path Saudi Arabia took when developing its oil industry, Bolivia
should initially allow foreign corporations to develop and begin lithium
production under a collaborative central company and then use revenues
from taxes on the profits of those corporations to gradually repurchase
shares of that company under a participation plan to increase the state-
owned share. This would allow Bolivia to benefit from outside help in
getting the industry up and running as well as ensure it has a share in the
process that could gradually revert to state control over time.
To protect the value and market for lithium, Bolivia should also en-
courage forming a lithium production organization like OPEC with its
peers in the lithium industry. This would achieve dual goals of ensuring
stable, regulated prices on the lithium market as well as further assure
foreign corporations that investment in Bolivia is not too risky. With a
proper statute and a judicial oversight arm to guide the conduct of mem-
ber countries and provide for sanctions against those who breach the lan-
guage, foreign corporations could be assured that their investment in
infrastructure and expected profits would be guaranteed.
Finally, to avoid some of the societal pitfalls of a government distribut-
ing resource-wealth to its people, Bolivia should set up a system for di-
rectly distributing proceeds to Bolivian citizens to increase their standard
of living, to encourage new investment in businesses and industries, and
to keep the government accountable by forcing it to rely on a system of
taxation for its budget.
With these policies and structures in place, Bolivia has great potential
to become a valuable, resource-producing nation that will finally benefit
from its own wealth and overcome centuries of abuse and mistreatment
by external forces.
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